The most studied property, secrecy, is not always sufficient to prove the security of a protocol. Other properties such as anonymity, privacy or opacity could be useful. Here, we use a simple definition of opacity which works by looking at the possible traces of the protocol using a new property over messages called similarity. The opacity property becomes a logical constraint involving both similarities and syntactic equalities. The main theorem proves that satisfiability of these constraints and thus opacity are decidable without having to make the hypothesis of atomic keys. Moreover, we use syntactic equalities to model some deductions an intruder could make by performing bit-to-bit comparisons (i.e. knownciphertext attack).
Introduction
During the last decade, verification of security protocols has been widely investigated. The majority of the studies focussed on demonstrating secrecy properties using formal methods (see for example [Clarke et al., 1998 ], [Comon-Lundh and Cortier, 2003] , [Comon-Lundh. and Cortier, 2002] or [Goubault-Larrecq, 2000] ). These methods have lead to effective algorithms and so to concrete tools for verifying secrecy such as these proposed by the EVA project [Bozga et al., 2002] or the Avispa project [Avispa, 1999] . However, checking security protocols requires studying other properties such as anonymity or opacity: hiding a piece of information from an intruder. For example, in a voting protocol, whereas the intruder is able to infer the possible values of the vote (yes or no), it should be impossible for him to guess which vote was ex-pressed, only by observing a session of this protocol. Checking a protocol should include a way of formalizing the informations that were leaked and that the intruder can guess. In the last few years, attempts have been made to properly define opacity properties, to prove their decidability in certain cases and to propose some verification algorithms. As far as we know, other versions of opacity ( [Boisseau, 2003] , [Hughes and Shmatikov, 2004] ) have been given in the literature but none of these criterion were implemented. Our notion of opacity is very close to the one introduced in [Hughes and Shmatikov, 2004 ] except that we use a formalism dedicated to protocols studies when they use a more general functional approach.
In this paper, we adopt a simple definition for opacity. The intruder C has a passive view of a protocol session involving two agents A and B. He is able to read any exchanged messages but he cannot modify, block or create a message. A property will be called opaque if there are two possible sessions of the protocol such that: in one of these, the property is true whereas it is not in the other, and it is impossible for the intruder to differentiate the messages from these two sessions from the messages exchanged in the original session. The starting point is the notion of similarity. This binary relation noted ∼ is an equivalence relation between messages. Two messages are similar if it is not feasible for the intruder to differentiate them. A typical example is two different messages encoded by a key that the intruder cannot infer. From the point of view of the intruder, these messages will be said similar. This notion is of course dependent of the knowledge of the intruder given by Dolev-Yao theory [Dolev and Yao, 1983] : if the intruder is able to infer any of the used keys, then similarity will be equivalent to syntactic equality. This notion of similarity will allow us to express opacity properties as constraints. These constraints will also include syntactic equality. Equalities are used to show that the intruder can perform bitto-bit comparisons between some messages (this is best known in the literature as known-ciphertext attacks). Let us give a simple example that will be useful throughout this paper. A simple electronic voting protocol is given by the transmission between A (the voter) and S (the authority counting votes). Variable v is the expressed vote chosen among the possible values yes or no.
If the intruder intercepts the value of {v} pub(S) , then as he can compare it to {yes} pub(S) and {no} pub(S) , the intruder is able to deduce the value of v. We will say that the intruder performed a bit-to-bit comparison between {v} pub(S) and {yes} pub(S) (or {no} pub(S) ).
The aim of this paper is to formalize opacity as two constraints involving similarities and equalities taking into account possible bit-to-bit comparisons. The main result is decidability of satisfiability for such constraints using a finite-model property.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we recall usual definition for messages and protocols. Similarity over messages is introduced in section 3 and some useful properties are given. This section also formalizes the opacity property and translates it to a constraint. Both section 2 and 3 are very close to sections appearing in [Mazaré, 2004] , they give the necessary basis to formalize the following sections. Then, section 4 proves that satisfiability for such constraints is decidable. Section 5 introduces the bit-to-bit comparisons in our constraints. Eventually, section 6 shows how to use this technique on a simple example, and section 7 concludes this paper.
Cryptographic Protocols
Let Atoms and X be two infinite countable disjoint sets. Atoms is the set of atomic messages a, b,... Set X contains variables called "protocol variables" x, y,... Definition 1 (Message) Let Σ be the signature Atoms∪{pair, encrypt} where pair and encrypt are two binary functions. The atomic messages are considered constant functions. Then a message is a first order term over Σ and the set of variables X, namely an element of T (Σ, X). A message is said to be closed if it is a closed term of T (Σ, X), i.e. a term of T (Σ).
In the rest of this paper, we will use the following notations:
Height of message m can be easily defined recursively and will be noted |m|. Substitutions σ from X to T (Σ, X) are defined as usual. Application of substitution σ to message m will be noted mσ. If σ is defined by xσ = n and yσ = y for any other variable y, then we could write m[x\n] instead of mσ. The domain of a substitution σ is the set dom(σ) of variables x such that xσ = x.
The set of variables used in a message m is noted var(m) (or f ree(m)).
Definition 2 (Protocol) Let Actors be a finite set of participants called actors. The set of programs P rogs is given by the following syntax where B is in Actors, m 1 , m 2 and m are messages.
A protocol over the set of actors Actors is a function from Actors to P rogs associating a program to each actor.
The intuitive semantic of programs is the usual one: signification of ! B m is to send the message m to agent B, signification of ?m is to receive a message and using pattern matching, to replace the variables learnt from m in the rest of the program. For the following, the set of actors is fixed to Actors. Let f ree be the function giving free variables of a program. It is easy to define f ree in the usual recursive way. Then, f ree can be extended over protocols. An instance of the protocol P is a protocol P σ where σ instantiates exactly the free variables of P with closed messages. For that purpose, it is possible to rename every bound variable with a fresh variable such that bound variables are distinct and not in the free variables set. The substitution σ is called a session of the protocol P . When there is no risk of confusion on the protocol, its name will be omitted. Thus, we will talk about a session σ.
Definition 3 (Protocol Semantic) The semantic of a protocol is the transition system over protocols defined by the following rules:
If m is a closed message and σ is the most general unifier of m and m (m is called the proto-message of m),
Note that, if σ does not exist, the protocol can be blocked. The transition is from the protocol P rog to the protocol P rog[A → P A ; B → P B ], i.e. the protocol linking A to program P A , B to program P B and other actors D to program P rog(D).
If m 1 and m 2 are the same closed message,
If m 1 and m 2 are two distinct closed messages,
A protocol P terminates iff for any Q such that P → * Q, it is possible to reach the state : Q → * . Note that only closed protocols could terminate. A run of a session σ for a protocol P is an ordered set of messages r = r 1 .r 2 ...r n such that
A protocol session is deterministic if it has exactly only one possible run. This run will be noted run(P σ). In the following sections, protocols will always be considered deterministic, i.e. each of their sessions is deterministic.
Eventually, to simplify notations, instead of writing:
We will shorten this to:
This paper will make an extensive use of Dolev-Yao theory [Dolev and Yao, 1983] . Let E be a set of messages and m be a message, then we will note E m if m is deducible from E using Dolev-Yao inferences.
Similarity and Opacity

Similarity
The intuitive definition of opacity is that an intruder is not able to distinguish a run where the property is satisfied from a run where it is not. To distinguish two messages, the intruder can decompose them, according to his knowledge but if he does not know the key k for example, he will not be able to make the difference between two different messages encoded by this key k. Two such messages will be called similar messages. This definition will be formalized using inference rules.
An environment is a finite set of closed messages. Usually, it will denote the set of messages known by the intruder. This definition will suppose that we only use symmetric key cryptography. However, all the following results can easily be generalized to public key cryptography.
Definition 4 (Similar Messages) Two closed messages m 1 and m 2 are said to be similar for the environment env iff env m 1 ∼ m 2 where ∼ is the smallest (w.r.t set inclusion) binary relation satisfying:
Intuitively, this means that an intruder with the knowledge env will not be able to distinguish two similar messages. The environment name will be omitted as soon as it is not relevant for comprehension. Our definition of ∼ is very closed to the ≡ operator introduced by Abadi and Rogaway in [Abadi and Rogaway, 2000] , except that we have an explicit environment to tell which keys are compromised instead of using directly the messages linked by the ≡ operator. Moreover, the definition of ∼ could easily be extended to non-closed environments and messages by adding this inference:
This can also be achieved by defining m ∼ n for non-closed messages as mσ ∼ nσ for each σ such that mσ and nσ are closed.
Property 1
The binary relation ∼ is an equivalence relation: let m 1 , m 2 and m 3 be three messages.
Proof 1 These three properties can easily be proved using an induction on the structure of message m 1 .
To prove that the ∼ relation is compatible with the context operation, we will have to suppose that only atomic keys are allowed. This hypothesis is only required for the following property. 
And in particular,
Let m and n be two messages and x a variable. Let σ be a substitution such that xσ ∼ nσ. Then
Proof 2 An induction on m 3 allows to deduce the first formulae. Then, using reflexivity of ∼, the second formulae is true. Eventually, the third formulae could be proved quickly with an induction on message m.
When considering similarity, an important problem is: given an environment env and a closed message m, what is the set of closed message n such that env n and env m ∼ n Note that the main difficulty is that we do not necesseraly have env m. For that purpose, the f resh function will be introduced. It is inductively defined over messages by the following equalities where all the variables y have to be instantiated with different fresh variables (i.e. variables that do not appear anywhere else).
y is a fresh variable
Property 3 For every substitution σ, we have
Proof 3 This can be proved using an induction on the structure of m.
If m is an atom or a variable then mσ = f resh(m)σ.
If m is a pair m 1 , m 2 , then we have m 1 σ ∼ f resh(m 1 )σ and m 2 σ ∼ f resh(m 2 )σ. So, we have:
If m is an encoding {m 1 } k and env kσ, then
If m is an encoding {m 1 } k and env kσ, then mσ ∼ {yσ} kσ ∼ f resh(m)σ.
The reciprocal of this property is that if m is similar to n, then n is an instance of f resh(m), i.e. f resh(m) where all free variables are instantiated by closed messages.
Property 4 Let m and n be two closed messages. If m ∼ n, then there exists a substitution σ that acts over the free variables of f resh(m) such that n = f resh(m)σ.
Proof 4 This proof can also be achieved using a simple induction on the structure of m.
The Opacity Problem
Let us consider a protocol P R and one of its session σ. We will be interested in predicates over σ, namely properties ψ that act over variables instantiated by σ. Such properties may express the identity of an agent, or the value of a vote, for instance. The opacity problem considered here relies on several hypothesis:
The intruder C has a passive view of protocol session σ involving two agents A and B. Passive means that the intruder can intercept and view any messages exchanged by A and B but is not able to block, modify nor to send any message.
The intruder knows the protocol used P R.
The intruder has an initial knowledge c 0 , which is a predicate (for example, c 0 = (k 1 = k 2 ) means that C knows that the keys that will instantiate k 1 and k 2 are the same).
If we consider the witness run run(P σ) = m 1 .m 2 ...m n , property ψ will be opaque if there exist two possible sessions σ 1 and σ 2 of the protocol giving messages similar to the witness messages (m 1 to m n ) where for example, ψσ 1 is true and ψσ 2 is false. In this case, the intruder will not be able to deduce any knowledge on ψσ. Of course, there is no need to find both σ 1 and σ 2 : if ψσ is true, then we could use σ instead of σ 1 , as exchanged messages are the same, they are similar. But we will keep this notation with three substitutions to show the symmetry of this problem.
Definition 5 (Opacity) A property ψ is said to be opaque for a protocol session σ of P iff there exist two sessions of the protocol σ 1 and σ 2 such that
Where p 1 .p 2 ...p n is the run of the protocol P related to σ 1 , q 1 .q 2 ...q n is related to σ 2 and m 1 .m 2 ...m n is related to σ. Note that the three runs must have the same length n.
The environment env used in the previous conjunctions is {m 1 , ..., m n , p 1 , ..., p n , q 1 , ..., q n } and could be augmented with an initial knowledge of the intruder env 0 . We defined opacity for a protocol session, this can be extended to protocols by saying that a property is opaque in a protocol if it is opaque for all its session. The problem is that the number of possible sessions (and their size) is unbounded. This leads to an unbounded number of possible behaviors for a protocol. In the following, we give a method to check opacity for a given session but we lack the method to extend it to a whole protocol.
For instance, let us consider the simple electronic voting protocol. Suppose that the session observed by the intruder is σ = [v\yes] . Then, the environment will be env = {yes, no, pub(S), {yes} pub(S) }. The predicates expressing the opacity of the vote value will be:
As both predicates are satisfiable, the vote value is opaque in this case.
Our property of opacity can also be used to check anonymity. For example, if we take a definition of anonymity closed to the one given in [Schneider and Sidiropoulos, 1996] , we just have to add a "restricted view" for the intruder, i.e. the intruder only intercepts some of the exchanged messages (for example, when considering a system with both secure and insecure channels). Then, opacity for property "identity of such actor" will be similar to what is defined as anonymity.
Initial Predicates and Satisfiability
In this section, the environment env is a finite set of closed messages. We will first define a class of predicates called initial predicates. Then, we will show that satisfiability for such predicates is decidable.
Definition 6 (Initial Predicates) The set IP of initial predicates is given by the following formulas:
Where m and n are two messages.
It is easy to extend initial predicates with the logical or operator ∨. This can be done by adding to the previous grammar the line:
P ::= P ∨ P Then, using usual rules on boolean operations, every predicate is equivalent to a predicate P of the form:
If satisfiability for these predicates is decidable, then satisfiability over initial predicates is, of course, decidable too. Reciprocally, let us suppose that satisfiability over initial predicates is decidable, then satisfiability of any P A in P is decidable and so is satisfiability of P . Thus, adding the ∨ operator is cost-less and will not be done here. The atomic predicate ¬ m can be added as syntactic sugar for {a} m ∼ {b} m where a and b are two distinct atoms. Indeed, these two messages could only be similar if message m is not deducible.
In order to prove satisfiability, we will first need the notion of model, that will be introduced in a very classical way.
Definition 7 (Model)
A substitution σ such that P σ is closed is a model of P iff σ |= P where |= is defined by:
The satisfiability problem is the usual one: given a predicate, we want to know wether there exists a model of this predicate or not. To study satisfiability, we will prove a finite model property: if a predicate is satisfiable, then there exists a valid model whose size is lower than a constant. If this holds, then to check satisfiability of a predicate, it is possible to try any models with a size lower than the constant: this gives us an immediate satisfiability checking algorithm (made of a finite number of checking steps which can all be achieved in finite time).
For that purpose, we will fix the notations. Let P be an initial predicate that is satisfiable and σ be a model of P . The set of messages keys is defined as the set of keys that appear in P : a message m is in keys iff there exists a message n such that {n} m is a sub-term of P . The set keys is of course finite and does not depend on the chosen model σ. Eventually, the set keys will be separated in two sets keys + and keys − defined by:
Note that there only exists a finite number of possibilities for keys + and keys − independently of σ. A substitution σ will be said adapted to keys + , keys − if the two following assertions are true:
The set of substitutions adapted to keys + , keys − will be noted ad(keys + , keys − ).
The idea is now to use these two sets of keys in order to formulate a rewriting system that will be correct for adapted models. Then, this rewriting system will terminate, giving us a simple normal form. With this normal form, we will be able to describe the set of models of the initial predicate. Eventually, we will show that there exists a model that is adapted (to keys + and keys − ) and whose size can be bounded. Model σ is supposed fixed and is, of course, a valid model of P .
Definition 8 (Rewriting System) The rewriting system R I is defined over the set of initial predicates by the following rules:
Dec ∼ {} 1 : If there exist m 2 , n 2 ∈ keys − such that m 2 σ = m 2 σ and n 2 σ = n 2 σ , {m 1 } m 2 ∼ {n 1 } n 2 → Dec ∼ {} 2 : Else, if there exist m 2 , n 2 ∈ keys + such that m 2 σ = m 2 σ and n 2 σ = n 2 σ ,
Single : If x is not in var(m 1 ) nor in var(m 2 ) and |m 1 | ≤ |m 2 |,
Atom ∼ : For atomic messages, a ∼ a → T ype ∼1 to T ype ∼4 : If a and b are two distinct atoms,
For the syntactic equality part, we will use classical unification rules noted Dec = {}, Dec = , Atom = and T ype =i . The resolution rules will be noted Res 1 and Res 2 . Res 1 occurs if x does not appear in m and does appear in P :
Res 2 occurs in the case where x appears in m (and m = x):
We do not have a resolution-like rule for similarity, because that kind of rule would not be correct. Consider three messages m, n and p. Having m similar to n does not imply that p[x\m] is similar to p[x\n]. In fact, using messages m = {a} k , n = {b} k and p = {c} x with environment {m, n} will prove that the former proposition is false when using nonatomic keys. Now, we will state some basic results over R I in the following properties.
Property 5 The rewriting system R I terminates. Moreover, R I is correct and complete for models in ad(keys + , keys − ).
Proof 5 To prove termination, we will define some measure related to an initial predicate Q. Let nb r be the number of variables that are not solved in Q. The definition of solved used here is the standard one used in unification. For details, see for example [Kirchner and Kirchner, 1999] . Let sd be the quantity defined by:
Where m 1 ∼ m 2 and m 1 = m 2 range over the atomic predicates (P A ) composing Q. And let nb v be the number of occurrences in Q of similarities that have the form x ∼ m. Then, the order < will be defined over initial predicates as the lexicographic order over (nb r , sd, nb v ). This order will decrease strictly when applying → as shown in this array :
And so, this proves that R I terminates. Correctness and completeness are trivial for rewriting rules borrowed to unification. For the Single rule, transitivity of similarity ensures correctness and completeness. For the Dec ∼ {} rules, this comes directly from the definition of ∼ and these rules are the reason why this is only correct for adapted models. Now that R I does terminate, we can focus on the normal forms obtained using R I on a predicate Q such that Q is adapted to keys, i.e. the set of keys related to Q is included in keys (of course, we will usually take Q = P ). It is easy to view that the normal form could be:
, then Q is satisfied by any model (for example, Q was a ∼ a).
⊥, then Q cannot be satisfied by any model (for example, Q was a ∼ b).
where the variables x i and y j are distinct, and the y j do not appear in any m i nor in any n k .
Let us consider the third case. The length of messages in the normal form can be majored independently from σ. The only rule that could make the maximal length of messages in Q grow is Res. In that case, the maximal length could be multiplied by two. But this rule can only occur one time for each variable in Q. So, if n is the number of variables in P , m is the maximal length of messages in Q, then the maximal length of messages in the normal form is lower than m.2 n . The worst case is to produce a message by piling up all the initial messages.
To compute the set of models satisfying Q, we will proceed in three steps. These steps are close to those used in the key quantification method proposed in [Mazaré, 2004] .
Replace m i by f resh(m i ) using keys + and keys − .
If there is a loop x i 1 ∼ m i 1 ,...,x iα ∼ m iα and x i 2 occurs in m i 1 ,... x i 1 occurs in m iα , then there are no models satisfying Q.
Else, there exists x i ∼ m i such that no variable x j (for j = i) occurs in m i . The possible values for x i are given by instantiating the free variables of m i with any possible messages. Like in unification, this can be done recursively for every x j and then for every y j .
Property 6 There exists a message f x for each variable x that is free in Q such that σ models Q iff there exists a message v i for each free variable z i in f x such that:
The substitution [z 1 \v 1 , ..., z c \v c ] related to a given σ will be noted σ e .
Proof 6 This is a direct consequence of the structure of the normal forms.
An important thing to notice is that the length of each f x can be bounded by a constant that only depends on P and Q. This comes from the bound over the length of messages appearing in the normal form. For the rest of this paper, we will consider Q = P and this bound will be noted C f (P ).
We now have given all the definition needed to formulate the finite model property.
Definition 9
The potential complexity of a predicate P , C(P ), is defined by:
Of course, the potential complexity depends only on P .
Theorem 1 (Finite Model) If a predicate P is satisfiable, then it admits a model σ such that
Corollary 2 Satisfiability of predicates in IP is decidable.
The finite model property is not enough to prove the corollary: the model is finite but there are an infinite number of possibilities for the atoms. This is not really a problem because we can restrict the possible atoms to those used in P as long as there are enough distinct fresh atoms such that all the leaf in any xσ can be distinct (as the length of xσ is small, this is possible).
Syntactic Equality
The addition of syntactic equality in predicates will be used to model the intruder performing bit-to-bit comparison between two deducible messages. For example, if the intruder has intercepted {v} pub(S) and has a bit-to-bit value equal to {yes} pub(S) , then he can deduce that the value of v is yes. Two such messages will be called identifiable messages. We will show in this section that the knowledge brought by identifiable messages is computable. A kind of attack close to this one has already been studied with different techniques under the name of guessing attacks in [Lowe, 2002] , [Gong et al., 1993] or [Delaune, 2003] . But these studies do not precisely link the values to the proto-messages as will be done here. In the previous section, we used the Dolev-Yao model: the only way to obtain some information from a ciphertext was to find the right key and to decode it. Here, we use a model where the intruder has stronger deduction capacities. This hypothesis holds for some encryption schemes but most of them use random bits so that these attacks are impossible to perform.
Definition 10 Let M = {m 1 , ..., m n } be a finite set of messages and σ be a substitution such that M σ is closed. We define σ as follows.
two times the same message linked to two different prototypes m and n, then he will be able to deduce the syntactic equality m = n.
Note that M σ m implies M σ mσ. The inverse is of course false (take for example m = x, M = {y} and xσ = yσ = a). First, we will prove a general property on our new theory: its locality. Proof 7 Let us consider a minimal proof of M σ m. The idea is to use an induction on the structure of the proof in order to demonstrate the property as long as another one: if the last rule is among (1), (4), (5) If two messages m and n are identifiable, then the intruder can add m = n to its knowledge. Now, we want to be able to add all the knowledge that can be inferred to the intruder's knowledge without testing any possible couple of messages. We want to show that this knowledge is computable in a finite time. For that purpose, we will state two distinct properties.
Property 8 The set of minimal identifiable messages is computable.
To prove this property, we will have to use the locality of our theory. This property will lead us to a decision algorithm capable of producing every possible pair of minimal identifiable messages. Let m and n be two minimal identifiable messages. Consider minimal proofs for M σ m and M σ n, using the symmetry between m and n, only three combinations of final rules for M σ m and M σ n are possible.
These rules are both 2 or 3: then either m = m 1 , m 2 and n = n 1 , n 2 , either m = {m 1 } m 2 and n = {n 1 } n 2 . Let us consider the case of pairs. As we have m = n, we have m 1 = n 1 or m 2 = n 2 . To fix the idea, we will consider m 1 = n 1 . We have, of course, m 1 σ = n 1 σ and M σ m 1 and M σ n 1 . So m 1 and n 1 are identifiable, there is a contradiction with the minimality of the pair m, n. That is why, these rules cannot occur at the end of minimal proofs.
If both rules are in 1, 4, 5 and 6. Then m and n are sub-messages from M . These messages are only in finite number.
If the rule concerning m is in 1, 4, 5 and 6 and the rule concerning n is in 2 and 3. Then m is a sub-message of M . As mσ = nσ, we have nσ in SM (M σ) (sub-messages, i.e. sub-terms of M σ). So we have
And we obtain a bound of the length of n:
The atoms occurring in n have to occur in M and the variables occurring in n have to be instantiated by σ. So there are only a finite number of possible messages for n.
To find all the minimal similar messages, we have to test all the messages whose lengths are below max(|p|, p ∈ SM (M σ)). Messages from SM (M ) are in that set. These messages can only use atoms used in M and variables instantiated by σ. That is why the set of messages to be tested is finite. Moreover, checking that two messages are identifiable and minimal can be done in a finite time too, and so all the minimal identifiable messages can be found in a finite time.
Property 9 If m and n are identifiable and p 1 ,...,p k are the positions such that m |p i and n |p i are identifiable and minimal, then for any model
Using properties stated in this section, we now have a method to model what an intruder can guess using bit-to-bit comparisons. Our method is easy to apply but inefficient as it tests any couple of message whose lengths are below a fixed bound. It produces constraints of the form m = n, they can be added to the opacity predicates. As we show in the previous section, satisfiability of the resulting predicates will remain decidable. More formally, M will be the awaited trace of the protocol in terms of proto-messages augmented with the initial knowledge of the intruder and env will be the set of intercepted messages as long as the initial knowledge, so we will usually take env = M σ. Then, opacity of a property P will be checked as satisfiability of to predicates S ∧ P and S ∧¬P where S contains similarities that occur in the opacity constraint. We will have to compute the set of minimal identifiable messages m 1 , n 1 to m k , n k . This gives use another predicate E defined by:
And so, we will study satisfiability of two predicates: E ∧ S ∧ P and E ∧ S ∧ ¬P . This will be applied in the next section on two very simple electronic voting protocols.
6.
Example: A Simple Electronic Vote Protocol
Simple Does Not Mean Secure
Let us consider the most simple electronic voting protocol. A is the voter and S the authority that will count the different votes. The possible votes are yes and no. Of course, one of the objective is that the expressed vote remains opaque. In a first version, the vote will just be sent from A to S encoded using the public key of S. The protocols is written:
Where v is chosen among the values yes and no. Let us suppose that the expressed vote is yes, so the substitution σ is defined by σ = [v\yes] . Then M is the set {{v} pub(S) , yes, no, pub(S)}. The environment env is the set M σ. The value of max(|p|, p ∈ SM (M σ)) is 2 (pub(S) is considered as an atomic message). We easily obtain the set of minimal identifiable messages:
{({v} pub(S) , {yes} pub(S) )} So E = ({v} pub(S) = {yes} pub(S) ), the constraints of opacity related to the value of v are:
{v} pub(S) = {yes} pub(S) ∧ {v} pub(S) ∼ {yes} pub(S) ∧ v = yes {v} pub(S) = {yes} pub(S) ∧ {v} pub(S) ∼ {yes} pub(S) ∧ v = no By using our rewriting system on the second predicate, we have v = yes ∧ {v} pub(S) ∼ {yes} pub(S) ∧ v = no And so this constraint can be rewrited to ⊥, the second constraint is not satisfiable. The value of v is not opaque: the intruder can guess the vote. Intuitively, we already shew how the intruder could guess the vote in the introduction. Now, we want to fix this opacity flaw by modifying the protocol.
Adding Complexity
The technique used by the intruder is to guess which message can be encrypted and to compare the result with the intercepted message. As we do not want the intruder to guess which message can be encrypted, we add a nonce in the protocol:
A → S : { v, n } pub (S) As in the previous example, let us suppose that the expressed vote is yes and the nonce is instantiated by a fresh atom N , so the substitution σ is defined by σ = [v\yes, n\N ] . Then M is the set {{ v, n } pub(S) , yes, no, pub(S)}. The environment env is the set M σ. The value of max(|p|, p ∈ SM (M σ)) is 3. But now, the set of minimal identifiable messages is empty, so the constraints of opacity concerning the value of v are:
{ v, n } pub(S) ∼ { yes, N } pub(S) ∧ v = yes { v, n } pub(S) ∼ { yes, N } pub(S) ∧ v = no It is easy to see that both constraints are satisfiable, so we now have that the expressed vote is opaque. This protocol can be used without fearing that an intruder can guess the value of the vote using bit-to-bit comparisons.
Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the notions presented in [Mazaré, 2004] : opacity is also defined as satisfiability of two constraints, but we do not need the hypothesis that keys are atomic anymore. However, the method introduced in [Mazaré, 2004] can be applicated to real case whereas our new method to decide satisfiability of constraints is far more complex. The set of predicates which satisfiability is decidable has been extended to predicates using syntactic equalities and non-atomic keys. Moreover, we introduced a new technique to determine what an intruder can guess using bit-to-bit comparisons. Now, we have two distinct theories: on one side Dolev-Yao and on the other side σ . Even if the two theories are closely linked, an idea for future work would be to produce a single theory modeling both kind of attacks. Another interesting extension would be to make the intruder active. If C can intercept and modify the messages, could he find the right messages to alter such that the property is not opaque any more ?
